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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

STEPHEN MICHAEL VAN DAM,

Case No.
12050

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant-appellant was charged by the Salt
Lake County Grand Jury with the crime of rape. The
case was tried to a jury in the District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and appellant convicted.
This is an appeal from the conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape
by jury verdict. Appellant moved for a new trial
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The
court denied appellant's motion for new trial.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the verdict of guilty
reversed and a new trial ordered.

FACTS OF CASE
On December 2, 1969, the complainant, Linda
Sue Laws, was at her home at 4325 South 9th East,
Salt Lake City, Utah. At about 1:OD p.m., she went
to take out her garbage and observed a man walking up the street to the apartment behind her (R10). About 5 or 10 minutes later, the same man appeared at her front door (R-11) and made some inquiries, also asking if she had a telephone book.
Mrs. Laws went to her bedroom to obtain the telephone book and found the man coming into her
bedroom with a knife (R-11), saying "Do what I tell
you or I'll kill you" (R-11). She described the knife
as:
"A. It had a long, shiny blade. It was white.
I couldn't see the handle of it too well. It
looked like it had a bone handle on it something like a hunting knife. It had a bone
handle" (R-12).

The intruder told Mrs. Laws to lie down on her
bed, where he took off her boots and levis. He then
told her to put a pillowcase over her head. Then
he unbuttoned her blouse and ripped her bra open
and took off her panties (R-13), and then she testified she "felt him inside her" (R-13). After, he told
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her to lie there five minutes. When she heard him
go out the door, she got up and ran to her neighbors, who called the police (R-14). The alleged rape
took place at about 1:30 p.m.
The neighbor, Mrs. Rita Weber, testified that
some time a£ter noon, Mrs. Laws knocked on the
door and said she had been raped (R-59); that she
comforted Mrs. Laws for about ten minutes and
then called the police, who arrived about 30
minutes later (R-59).
The police record indicates the telephone call
was received at 1:48 p.m., and that it took about 30
minutes to locate the address (R-63). Upon arrival,
the police officer took into evidence the bedclothes
and clothing of Mrs. Laws, and obtained a description of the alleged assailant. Defendant was identified from pictures shown to Mrs. Laws. Mrs. Laws
had described her assailant as being blond and
wearing a green jacket, Levis and cowboy boots.
At approximately 3:00 to 3.45 p.m., Mrs. Laws
was examined by a physician who determined that
she had had sexual intercourse within 6 to 8 hours,
but found no evidence of forceful entry (R-7).
Defendant was arrested after the Salt Lake
County Grand Jury issued its indictment and, when
arrested, a knife was taken from his car and a green
jacket from him. These were placed into evidence,
together with the items removed from Mrs. Laws'
home. The bedsheet, pillowcase and coat were forwarded to the FBI lab for identification. The tom

4

bra was presented to the Salt Lake Grand Jury as
evidence (R-78).
An FBI agent testified that he examined the
bedsheet, pillowcase and coat, and found fibers removed from the sheet and pillowcase that matched
the characteristics of the coat; he testified also that
it was possible for some garment, other than defendant's coat, to have left the fibers (R-101).

Defendant testified that on the day in question,
he had been home fa-om work because of a back
ailment, and that he lived in the basement apartment of his grandmother at 1247 Iris Lane, which is
approximately 1.4 miles from the Laws residence
(R-187). That at about 11:00 a.m. on that day, he purchased a voltage regulator from Hansen Auto
Wrecking (R-111) to use in fixing one of his cars;
that he was wearing patched Levi's, a white T-shirt
and a long sleeved green army shirt. After making the purchase, defendant returned home where
he worked on his car until about 12:00 noon. At
about this time, defendant's grandmother, who was
at home, came out and told defendant to come in
and put some heat on his back, which defendant
did. Defendant also fixed his lunch and ate it (R-114).
Defendant's grandmother, Lucille Conyers, a nurse,
was at home in her kitchen working near the window, and could observe defendant while he
worked on his car (R-127). She saw him go into the
basement apartment at about 12:00 noon, and heard
him preparing his lunch and moving around in the
apartment (R-128, 138), and never saw him leave the
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house until about 1:30 p.m. (R-131). She was at a
point in the home where she could observe all who
would come and go from the house. She saw no
one leave until defendant went out to resume
working on his car at 1:30 p.m. Mrs. Conyers observed defendant on at least one occasion in the
home between 12:00 noon and 1:30 p.m., when he
came upstairs to use the bathroom (R-137), but she
heard him in the apartment during the entire period.
She also had full view of the cars in front of the
house, and they were not moved during this time.
At exactly 1:34 p.m., Mrs. Conyers looked at
her clock, since she had to leave for work at 2:00
p.m., and was checking her time. She then also
observed the defendant in front of the house, talking to his mother, Elaine Van Dam, while he attached battery jump cables to her car in an attempt
to start his.
Defendant was wearing a green army shirt with
long sleeves and a white T-shirt when he was working on his car, as observed by Mrs. Conyers (R-140).
Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., defendant was
working on his car in the presence of his mother,
Elaine Van Dam, and his aunt, Rosanna Pitts (R-150).
Defendant further testified that he had been
working on his car between 11 :00 and 12:00 noon
on the day in question; that at noon he went into
his apartment, fixed lunch, rested and watched T.V.
until about I :30 p.m. (R-114). At about 1:30 p.m., he
went outside to work on his car; he started towards
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his mother's house (R-114), but traveled only about
40 feet, when he saw his mother driving towards
him. He asked her to pull her car next to his so he
could hook up a jump cable (R-115). He worked
there trying to start the car for about 20 minutes
(R-116). He further testified that he did not know the
complainant, Mrs. Laws, had never seen her before,
had never been in her home, and had never raped
her.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, WHEN
EVIDENCE MISSING AT THE TIME OF TRIAL WAS
LOCATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TRIAL.

During the course of the trial, the State's witness testified concerning the physical evidence surrounding the alleged rape. Reference was made to
the knife used by the assailant and to the ripped
bra of Linda Sue Laws. These items of evidence
were in the possession of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Deputy. The knife had been held for evidence, and the ripped bra had been presented to
the Grand Jury. Defendant did not have possession
of either item. When requested to produce the
knife and the bra, after much testimony concerning
them was before the jury, the State's witness,
Deputy Sheriff Sidney Elliott, advised the court
that they had been lost by the Sheriffs Office of
Salt Lake County; thus, nothing was available for
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inspection by the jury. Much was made of the fact
that the victim was forced, at knife point, to submit
to the carnal demands of her attacker, and of the
fact that she had submitted only because of the use
of the knife. Likewise, it was brought to the
attention of the jury that a knife was found in defendant's car. The fact that the knife was not produced, even though defendant tried to explain and
describe it, left only a vision in the minds of the
jurors that could not be erased, except by the production of the knife for inspection. No amount of
describing or explaining would alter that impression, and nothing short of presentation of the knife
itself could change the impression of the jury. The
victim described the knife as a "bone-handled hunting knife." Defendant described the knife as a
"wooden-handled kitchen paring knife." Since a
knife was used, and since a knife was found in the
defendant's car, it seems only reasonable that the
jury would make some comparative conclusions,
unless the knife was actually presented so that
they could see that the knife taken from defendant's
car could in no way be described in the way the
victim described the knife used by her attacker.
Had the knife been produced at trial, it appears
probable that it would have greatly supported defendant's defense and alibi, and that the jury would
have reached a conclusion different from the
verdict of guilty they returned. The alleged loss of
the knife took from the defendant a very important
element of his defense. Since the prosecution,
through the sheriff's office, had determined to take
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into custody this element of defendant's defense,
it seems most appropriate that they should be held
to the highest degree of protective custody to insure that the defendant is not denied any of his
rights to that defense. The fact that the knife was
conveniently found within two days after the trial,
leaves his writer concerned as to whether or not
it was in fact lost.
The torn brassiere of the victim was also described to the jury, and from its description it was
indicated that a great force was used in connection
with the alleged rape. This item of evidence likewise was not produced for inspection oft the jury,
since it was also lost at the time d trial. In view
of the fact that this article of clothing would have
unquestionably given grounds for substantial
cross-examination, which, with an actual inspection
of the garment by the jury, could have, and probably would have, sustained defendant's defense in
the minds of the jurors, it seems that this element
of establishing his innocence was likewise denied
the defendant. This is particularly true, since the
information of counsel is that the brassiere was the
only item of evidence furnished to the grand jury
at the time the indictment in this matter was returned.
It is recognized that this court has stated on
many occasions that the granting or denying of a
new trial is within the discretion of the trial court,
and will not be interfered with, unless abusive of,
or failure to exercise such discretion is clearly

-----------
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shown-see State vs. Cooper, 114 U. 531; 201 P.2d 764.

It is thus apparent from the evidence that the pres-

ence of the lost items was important to defendant's
defense, and that the court's failure to grant a new
trial after the items were located was an absolute
abuse of its discretion.

In the case of State of Utah vs. Ronald Gellatly, 22
U.2d 149, 449 P.2d 993, the court established the
ground rules under which newly discovered evidence could be the proper basis of a new trial.
There, the court stated:
"Newly discovered evidence, to be the grounds
for a new trial, must fulfill the following requirements: (1) it must be such as could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered
and produced at the trial; (2) it must not be
merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to
render a different result probable of the retrial of the case."

708.

See also Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347; 57 P.2d

Thus, the court supports the general rule as set
forth in 39 Am. Jur., New Trials, Par. 158, Page 165,
where it is stated:
"To warrant the granting of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must
appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted,
that it has been discovered since the trial, that
it could not have been discovered before the
trial by the exercise of due diligence, that it
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is material to the issue, and that it is not
merely cumulative or impeaching."

From the circumstances and evidence here, it
appears without question that the lost evidence
is evidence that was discovered after trial since at
the time of the trial it was represented to the court
that it had been lost and was not available for use
and presentation to the jury (R-115); that it could
not have been discovered by defendant prior to
trial, since it was in the safekeeping of the prosecution, and defendant had no knowledge or belief,
or even a suspicion that the items would not be
available at the time of trial; and that the evidence
is of such a character that, had it been reviewed
and considered by the jury, it appears probable
that it would have left a strong reasonable doubt
as to defendant's guilt, such doubt being of the
nature that would have probably resulted in the
acquittal of the defendant.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.

In this case, time, as shown by the evidence,
becomes a highly important element, and an element which disproves Linda Sue Laws' claim that
defendant raped her, and proves defendant's claim
that he was over a mile away in his apartment and
working on his car when the alleged rape occurred.
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It is important to note that Linda Sue Laws appeared before the Salt Lake County Grand Jury
on the 5th day of December, 1969, just three days
after the alleged rape, and testified that she was
raped at 1:30 p.m. on December 2, 1969. It is also
important to note that the District Attorney, in his
answer to defendant's application for a bill of particulars, stated that the exact time of the alleged
rape was 1:45 p.m., December 2, 1969 (transcript of
proceedings P-39). Also, it is highly significant that
in her direct testimony, Linda Sue Laws placed the
time of the alleged rape at about 1:30 p.m.-as she
had testified to the grand jury. It has never been
suggested that the incident took place prior to I :30
p.m.
Mrs. Laws testified that at about I :OD p.m. she
saw a man walking on the street behind her house,
as she was taking out her garbage (R-10). She went
to the rear yard of the home and returned (R-10).
She said she thought she was outside for about
two minutes (R-22). About 10 minutes later, or between 1: 12 and 1: 15 p.m., the same man appeared
at her front door. She identified the defendant as
the same man. After a few minutes conversation,
she went to the bedroom to get a phone book and
found the man in the doorway of the bedroom with
a knife in his hand. Some time had unquestionably
passed so that a conservative estimate would put
the assailant at the bedroom door at about 1: 18 to
l :20 p.m. Mrs. Laws testified that she was then requested to lie on the bed and put a pillowcase over
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her head. Then the assailant unbuttoned her blouse,
took off her pants, ripped off her bra, and took off
her panties, after which he did nothing for
"awhile" (R-13). If this all took only three minutes,
then the time would be about 1:23 p.m.
Linda Sue Laws testified that the actual intercourse act took place about 5 minutes, as found on
page 41 of the record:
"Q.

A.

About how long would you guess, if you
would give me a mean estimate of this
time, that the actual act of intercourse
took place?
About five minutes."

Thus, the actual intercourse representing the
alleged rape would have been completed at approximately 1:28 p.m. Mrs. Laws stayed in the bed
another two minutes, got dressed and went to the
neighbors, which would have been about 1:30 p.m.
The testimony was that the neighbors comforted
her for about 10 minutes, then called her husband,
and then the police. The police log indicated the
call was received at 1:48 p.m. (R-179), or about 20
minutes after the assailant left the Laws house.
The evidence of defendant's grandmother was
that she saw defendant in front of the home at exactly 1:45 p.m. within 4 to 6 minutes of the time
Linda Sue Laws claimed defendant was raping her.
It is extremely important to observe that Rita
Weber, the neighbor of Linda Sue Laws, testifiied
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that Mrs. Laws came to the back door crying, was
invited in, and that Mrs. Weber gave her two
aspirins and a cup of coffee, and let her cry for
about 10 to 15 minutes before calling the police
(R-179). Since the police received the telephone call
at 1:48 p.m., it would therefore sustain the testimony
of Mrs. Laws that the claimed rape, in fact, occurred
at about 1:30 p.m. However, for the defendant to
have been involved at that time, and observed by
Mrs. Conyers at 1:34 p.m., he would have had to
possess more speed than an Olympic champion,
since it took 4 minutes for Deputy Sherif£ Elliott,
to drive the distance from defendant's house to the
Laws residence (R-187), and defendant would have
been required to cover the same distance on foot,
since no cars left the Conyers home between 11 :00
a.m. and 2:00 p.m. (R-136, 143). In addition, the defendant would have had to change his clothing
when he returned in order to appear as Mrs. Conyers observed him, all of which is humanly impossible.
This court has held that the issue of time, where
the defense of alibi is injected, is important. See
State vs. Wade, 92 U. 297, 67 P.2d 647; State vs. Cooper,
supra. While it is realized that in those cases the
court was only concerned with the date of the crime
alleged, it appears no less important, where the
time of the occurrence is a factor, as here, that the
hour of the alleged incident be afforded equal import. Thus, as here, where a rape is alleged to
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occur at one location at a specific time of the day,
and the defendant can, without question, prove his
being at another distant location at the same time,
the matter of time is important and creates factually
more than a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the defendant.
Where defendant can account for his activities,
not only on the day of the alleged crime, but also
at the exact time that the rape was alleged to have
happened, it seems without question that the guilt
of defendant has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, an objective analysis of
the evidence indicates that reasonable minds could
not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty, and so the verdict of the jury cannot and must not stand. See State vs. Mills, 122 U. 306,
249 P.2d 211
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED.

Notwithstanding the verdict of the jury that the
appellant raped Linda Sue Laws, and without considering appellant's claim of innocence, the facts
as presented by the trial evidence do not support
the claim that the crime of rape was committed.
In order for the crime of rape to be committed,
the act must be against the resistance of the complainant. The general rule is stated in 44 Am. Jur.,
Rape. p. 905, as follows:
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"
. resistance must be by acts and must be
reasonably proportionate to the strength and
opportunities of the woman. She must resist
the consummation of the act, and her resistance must not be a mere pretense, but must be
in good faith, and must persist until the offense is consummated."

This court has more strictly evolved the general rule when it stated in State vs. Horne, 12 U. 2 162,
364 P.2d 109:
"The old rule of 'resistance to the utmost' is
obsolete. The law does not require that the
woman shall do more than her age, strength,
the surrounding facts and all attending circumstances make it reasonable for her to do in
order to manifest her opposition." See also
State vs. Roberts, 91 U. 117, 63 P.2d 584.

A review of the facts as presented here indicates that Linda Sue Laws did nothing to resist her
claimed violation, nor did she do anything to manifest her opposition to the claimed offense.
Mrs. Laws testified that she saw her claimed assailant with a knife in his hand, at which time he
said: "Do what I tell you or I'll kill you." (R-12). She
further stated that the only things he told her to do
were to "lie down on the bed" (R-12), and put a
pillowcase over her head (R-13). She also testified
that she did not see the knife after she first saw it
in his hand at the bedroom door (R-33, 36).
Thereafter, Mrs. Laws claims, the assailant removed her clothing, ripped her bra, and raped her,
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during the course of which she neither saw nor
felt the knife. Mrs. Laws also testified that her assailant did not touch her with his hands, except when
he ripped her bra (R-37, 39).
When questioned as to her resistance, she
stated:
"Q.

You knew he was having intercourse with
you at that time?"

A.

"Yes."

Q.

"Did you scream?"

A.

"No, I didn't scream."

Q.

"Did you make any effort to close your
legs to prevent him from having intercourse with you?"

A.

"No, I didn't."

Q.

"Did you do anything at this time to resist him?"

A.

"No." (R-39).

Thus, it is clear that Mrs. Laws offered no resistance to the claimed rape. She did not vocally
or physically offer any resistance, nor did she do
anything to manifest her opposition to the claimed
o£fense. It would certainly seem that at least some
token resistance should have been made. For her
to do nothing under the facts and circumstances
could not be considered even as a mere pretense
of resistance, let alone resistance of good faith, as
required by the general rule of law stated earlier.
44 Am. Jur. 905, supra.
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Without some effort to either avoid the rape or
to let her opposition be known, it does not reasonably appear that the alleged crime was even committed.

CONCLUSION
The failure of the trial court to grant a new trial
after the evidence missing during the trial was
found, was an abuse of discretion that prohibited
the innocence of the appellant from being properly brought to the view of the jury. This error must
be corrected by the court.
This glaring error, coupled with the facts which
establish not only that no rape was in fact committed, but that appellant could not have been at the
home of the complainant, is so closely akin that a
verdict of innocence is probable at a trial where
all facts and all evidence are presented for consideration. To not afford the appellant a total trial is
to deny him his entire future; a new trial should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DANSIE, ELLETT AND HAMMILL

